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If President Bill Clinton follows through on his oft-repeated campaign
promise to take his turn at making the welfare system pro-family and pro-
work, he will follow the footprints of Presidents Lyndon Johnson, Richard
Nixon, Jimmy Carter and Ronald Reagan into the Middle East of domestic
policy and politics. The political history of welfare reform can also be captured
in the tale of the scorpion who asked the camel to carry him across the Nile.
The camel said, "But if you get on my back, you will sting me and
kill me."
The scorpion replied, "Then we will both drown."
The camel thought for a moment, decided the scorpion made
obvious sense, and invited the scorpion to get on his back.
Halfway across the river, in the deepest water and most treacherous
currents, the scorpion stung the camel.
"Why did you do that? Why?" asked the astonished camel. "Now
we will both drown."
"This is the Middle East, my friend," explained the scorpion.
Welfare reform, so forcefully in the vision of candidate Clinton, has yet
to blip on the radar screen of President Clinton. But he is a man set to keep
his campaign promises during his first term, and it is only a matter of time
before he spells out his proposals to rewrite the welfare laws. The articles in
this issue of the Yale Law & Policy Review-stemming, as they do, from the
experience of Judith Gueron, who heads the Manpower Development Research
Corporation; Robert Moffitt, an economist from Brown University; Stephen
Loffredo, a professor of law and constitutional scholar; Ann Collins and
Barbara Reisman, child care activists; and Senator David Boren, who has both
scratched and been scratched in the thorny politics of America's welfare
system-will certainly inform the debate and help shape the developing policies
of the President and the Congress on welfare reform.
If history is any teacher, the contest to reshape the welfare system will be
a long, tendentious, sometimes nasty, occasionally arcane discussion among
conservatives and liberals, blacks and whites, men and women, federal and
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state governments, taxpayers and the poor. In the process, some of the strange
political alliances that emerge to promote policy goals will ultimately drown
in the perilous currents of welfare politics. A clear-eyed view of the murky
waters ahead is a useful tool in the quest for welfare reform.
Ever since Lyndon Johnson in the mid-1960s, presidents have recommend-
ed that Congress make the system more pro-family, notably by getting rid of
the rule that says the man has to leave the house in order for the mother and
children to receive benefits, and by encouraging welfare recipients to go to
work. Johnson was particularly concerned with protecting the black family and
spoke of it often, both publicly and privately. He was especially eloquent in
his speech, "To Fulfill These Rights," at Howard University on June 4, 1965:
Perhaps most important-its influence radiating to every part of life-is the
breakdown of the Negro family structure. For this, most of all, white America
must accept responsibility. It flows from centuries of oppression and persecution
of the Negro man. It flows from the long years of degradation and discrimination,
which have attacked his dignity and assaulted his ability to produce for his family.
This, too, is not pleasant to look upon. But it must be faced by those whose
serious intent is to improve the life of all Americans.
Only a minority-less than half-of all Negro children reach the age of 18 having
lived all their lives with both of their parents. At this moment, tonight, little less
than two-thirds are at home with both of their parents. Probably a majority of all
Negro children receive federally-aided public assistance sometime during their
childhood.
When Johnson called on the nation to wage the War on Poverty, he backed
his rhetoric with resources for education, health care, job training and jobs.
His preference was to take the array of cash programs-Aid to Families with
Dependent Children (AFDC, the program that comes to the minds of most
people when they think of welfare), food stamps, veterans' disability benefits,
social security, etc.-and combine them into a single easy-to-administer income
maintenance program.
The politics of enacting such a broad income maintenance proposal soon
became impossible even for this extraordinarily adept legislator and President.
Instead, Johnson decided to increase cash payments to the needy through
existing programs. He got Congress to increase minimum social security
benefits a whopping 59%, lifting almost three million senior citizens out of
poverty in one legislative swoop. He extended food stamp programs to
additional counties and made Medicaid available to not only AFDC recipients,
but other "medically indigent" citizens as well.
Richard Nixon pushed the supplemental security income program into high
gear, providing cash benefits and Medicaid coverage to the blind and
permanently disabled who were not eligible for social security disability
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payments. Thanks to the imagination and persistence of his White House
assistant Daniel Patrick Moynihan, Nixon also proposed the Family Assistance
Program to try to hold welfare families together and offer them incentives to
work. Congress refused to pass the program.
Gerald Ford's brief tenure, and his need to concentrate on reuniting the
nation in the wake of Watergate and Vietnam, gave him little time to navigate
the turbulent tides of welfare reform. But Jimmy Carter jumped in with both
feet.
President Carter insisted on proposing a reform plan that carried no
additional cost. That was an impossible dream, but he had read the country
well. He knew that most of the American people and their representatives in
the Congress were in no mood to pour more money into a failed system for
poor people, particularly one that was viewed as predominantly for the benefit
of blacks.
Eventually Carter settled on the concept of no added initial cost and we
sent a reform plan to the Congress in mid-1977. At my urging (serving at the
time as Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare), the Speaker of the
House, Thomas P. O'Neill, set up a special committee to move the legislation
rapidly, and the Senate Finance Committee set up a special subcommittee
chaired by Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan. We thought we were on the way
to reform at last. Hopes and expectations ran high.
Then on June 6, 1978, the citizens of California, in revolt against
government spending, voted overwhelmingly for Proposition 13, the proposal
to slash the state's property taxes. The next day, as I headed to the House
Speaker's office, Thomas S. Foley, who was then chairman of the Agriculture
Committee, stopped me in the hall off the House floor, and said, "Joe, you've
got to bury that damn welfare bill. With this vote in California, these guys will
destroy it on the floor and the President will suffer a humiliating defeat." A
few minutes later, Speaker O'Neill confirmed that California's Proposition 13
had put the final nail in the coffin of welfare reform for the Carter Administra-
tion.
We had more success with efforts to improve the enforcement of child
support obligations, although we had to fight our way through a thicket of
opposition. Senator Russell Long, then Chairman of the Senate Finance
Committee, pushed through legislation to beef up child support collection,
which I supported and rigorously enforced as Secretary of H.E.W. At the
time, many liberals strongly opposed enforcement as a punitive and unproduc-
tive approach to welfare reform. But as the program took hold and collection
rates improved dramatically, and as the nation came to appreciate the plight
of the single female parent, attitudes changed. Today most reformers view
child support enforcement as an important component of welfare policy.
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Less constructively, however, President Ronald Reagan used the welfare
system as a favorite whipping boy during his campaigns for President, often
citing a case from his own imagination about rip-offs by a tawdry "welfare
queen." President George Bush muted the rhetoric, but did little to change the
program. During these years, Senator Moynihan kept chipping away at the
program's destructive provisions, trying to make welfare an effective social
tool to help families stay together and encourage parents to seek work. His
efforts helped produce the Family Support Act of 1988, a rare bipartisan
accomplishment that has since been starved for the funding necessary to put
the reforms into practice.
Now President Bill Clinton is proposing to limit to two years the time that
any one adult can spend on welfare, almost as a desperation move to get them
to work. But there are already questions being raised: Is it fair? Suppose the
mother gets sick? Suppose she really tries and can't find a job? Will the
government guarantee her a job? How much will care for her children cost
when she works, and is the taxpayer going to pick up the tab? Will welfare
recipients be the only people guaranteed taxpayer-bankrolled child care when
they go to work? Is such a guarantee politically feasible? Will the two-year
cut-off effectively eliminate a welfare family's access to the health care system
in the absence of a national health program requiring all employers to provide
insurance to their employees? Will the government continue to provide
Medicaid for welfare mothers and their children after the mother goes to work?
For how long?
These questions and a score of variations on each will be raised once
President Clinton dots the i's and crosses the t's of his welfare reform plan.
The policymakers in Washington and the state houses-as well as citizens and
taxpayers-are fortunate that the Yale Law & Policy Review is publishing this
volume of articles to offer some light before the political debate turns up the
heat.
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